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By Theodore J. St. Antoine 
A quarter century ago, I used the phrase " reader" to charact 
role an arbitrator plays in constru-
ing a collective bargaining agree-
ment.1 This phrase has almost 
invariably been misunderstood to 
refer to reading or interpreting 
the contract. 
When I spoke of the "contract 
reader," it was in the context 
judicial review of an 
point was this: When a c 
before it an arbitrator's 
applying a collective ba 
agreement, it is as if the e 
and the union had -signed 
lation stating: "What the 
tor says this contract means is 
exactly what we me to say. 
That is what we inte by 
agreeing the award would be 'final 
and binding.' " In this sense an 
"erroneous interpretation" of the 
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contract by the arbitrator is a contra-
diction in terms. 
This paper updates this thesis, 
emphasizing what may be the hottest 
issue in judicial review: When may a 
court set aside an arbitral award on the 
ground that it violates public policy? It 
also addresses the "contract interpreta-
tion" aspect of the "contract reader"-
namely, How should an arbitrator go 
about "reading" or interpreting a con-
tract? 
In the Steelworkers trilogy the U.S. 
Supreme Court made arbitration the 
linchpin in the federal scheme for the 
implementation of collective bargain-
ing agreements.2 In Enterprise Wheel, 
one of the three cases, the Court 
imposed tight constraints on judicial 
review of arbitral awards. So long as 
the award is not the product of fraud or 
corruption, does not exceed the arbi-
trator's authority under the parties' 
submissions, and "draws its essence" 
from the labor contract, a court is to 
enforce the award without any attempt 
to "review the merits." Despite these 
strictures, the itch of the judiciary to 
right seeming wrongs compelled the 
Court to revisit the subject in 
Paperworkers v. Misco. 3 
Misco presented the public policy 
question in dramatic fashion. The 5th 
Circuit had refused to enforce an award 
reinstating a paper-cutting machine 
operator, whose car had been found to 
contain marijuana while parked in the 
company lot. The Supreme Court 
reversed, declaring that "as long as the 
arbitrator is even arguably construing or 
applying the contract and acting within 
the scope of his authority, that a court is 
convinced he committed serious error 
does not suffice to overturn his deci-
sion." The Court cautioned that "a 
court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's 
interpretation of [labor] contracts is lim-
ited to situations where the contract as 
interpreted would violate 'some explicit 
public policy' that is 'well defined and 
dominant, and is to be ascertained by 
reference to the laws and legal prece-
dents and not from general considera-
tions of supposed public interests.' " 
Many lower courts have still not 
got the message. Judges have been so 
offended by the reinstatement of 
deviant postal workers, sexual harassers 
and alcoholic airline pilots that they 
have disregarded the Supreme Court's 
directives in Enterprise Wheel and Misco. 
The 1st and 5th Circuits have taken it 
upon themselves to find an award at 
odds with their notions of public poli-
cy, even though the action ordered 
would not have violated any positive 
law or established public policy had it 
been taken by the employer on its own 
initiative.4 The 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th 
and D.C. Circuits have been more 
faithful to the Misco mandate. 5 The 
2nd, 3rd, 8th and 11th Circuits have 
vacillated on the issue, but the most 
recent decisions seem more in line with 
Misco. 6 
The rejection of otherwise legiti-
mate awards on the basis of a nebulous 
public policy usually is based on the 
highly subjective feelings of particular 
judges. For me, three estimable critics 
have correctly assessed the problem 
and arrived at the right solution. In 
various formulations, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook and professors Charles 
Craver and David Feller have conclud-
ed that if the employer (or the employ-
er in conjunction with the union) has 
the lawful authority to take unilaterally 
the action directed by the arbitrator, 
such as reinstatement of a wrongdoing 
employee, the arbitral award should be 
upheld against "pubic policy" claims.7 
This simple principle seems so 
self-evident, and so implicit in the 
Supreme Court's rulings to date, that it 
should become the accepted norm in 
the future. This approach is entirely in 
keeping with the underlying notion 
that the arbitrator is the parties' desig-
nated spokesperson when it comes to 
reading and applying the contract. It 
merely confirms that arbitration is a 
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final and binding dispute resolution 
procedure, as it is almost invariably 
described in the parties' contracts. 
We may shortly have further 
enlightenment from the Supreme 
Court on this issue. In March 2000 the 
Court granted certiorari in Eastern 
Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers. 8 
This was a case of marijuana ingestion 
by a mobile equipment operator. The 
lower courts sustained the employee's 
reinstatement. They acknowledged 
that federal regulations expressed a 
"well defined and dominant public pol-
icy" against drug use by "those in safe-
ty-sensitive positions," but went on to 
say: "there is no such policy against the 
reinstatement of employees who have 
used illegal drugs in the past.'' The 4th 
Circuit affirmed without deigning to 
publish its opinion. 
" 
The key issue is whether the reme-
dial action ordered by the arbitrator, not 
the triggering conduct of the employee, 
is contrary to public policy. Of course 
the drug-taking employee acted contrary 
to public policy. But the award-issuing 
arbitrator did not and his or her decision 
should stand. That is the way the 
Supreme Court should rule in this case. 
Is vacating an arbitral award on the 
ground that it has "no rational basis" 
contrary to the "contract reader" the-
sis? Regrettably, I cannot say that it is. 
In agreeing to a final and binding arbi-
tration procedure, the parties presum-
ably took it for granted that arbitrators 
would not be insane and would not 
reach decisions that are totally unrea-
sonable. In any event, it is probably 
impossible to keep courts from inter-
vening, on one theory or another, 
when an award seems utterly irrational. 
One can only hope that careful, artful 
crafting of arbitral opinions will keep 
this judicial exception to the finality 
doctrine to the barest minimum. 
Continued on page 14 
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Arbitrators have a tough job. How 
should they go about divining the par-
ties' intent when the reality is the par-
ties never contemplated the particular 
issue that has arisen? What should they 
do when the "plain meaning" of the 
contract conflicts with bargaining his-
tory or established practice? 
Numerous arbitrators of high 
repute have accepted (or at least paid lip 
service to) the plain meaning rule and its 
benighted first cousin, the parol evi-
dence rule.9 Carlton Snow and Richard 
Mittenthal have said nearly all that 
needs to be said about the plain mean-
ing rule and past practice. Snow bluntly 
stated: "Arbitrators' continued invoca-
tion of the plain meaning rule is anom-
alous in light of the trend to reject the 
rule by the courts, the [Uniform 
Commercial Code], the Restatement 
[of Contracts], and treatise writers." 10 
Mittenthal was prepared to declare 
almost 40 years ago that past practice 
"may be used to clarify what is ambigu-
ous, to give substance to what is general, 
and perhaps even to modify or amend 
what is seemingly unambiguous."11 
California Supreme Court Justice 
Roger Traynor put his finger on the 
problem when he said: 
A rule that would limit the deter-
mination of the meaning of a writ-
ten instrument to its four-corners 
merely because it seems to the 
court to be clear and unambiguous, 
would either deny the relevance of 
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the intention of the parties or pre-
suppose a degree of verbal preci-
sion and stability our language has 
not attained. 12 
In my view, if fidelity to the par-
ties' intent (or their putative intent 
about an unanticipated problem) is the 
touchstone of sound 
contract interpretation, 
the a priori rejection of 
any evidence reason-
ably probative of that 
intent cannot be justi-
fied. In collective bar-
gaining, what I call 
"contextual interpreta-
tion" is likely to be 
grounded in evidence 
concerning negotiating 
history and past prac-
tice. 
Recent decisions 
indicate that some arbitrators are pre-
pared to look behind the apparent plain 
meaning of the written instrument to 
discern intent from bargaining history 
and other parol evidence. 13 (Some arbi-
trators play it safe by finding an ambi-
guity in the contract language, which 
makes their resort to extrinsic evidence 
quite conventional.) 
Logically there seems no reason 
not to consider such evidence. If the 
parties decided to cloak certain provi-
sions of their agreement in a private 
code for reasons they considered suffi-
cient (for example, to conceal trade 
secrets from the employer's competi-
tors), an arbitrator should entertain 
evidence to that effect, however clear 
and unambiguous the language might 
otherwise appear. 14 
What about the practical argument 
in favor of the plain meaning rule-
the time and cost of trying to prove 
that what seems clear and unambiguous 
is not. Here, as in so many other areas, 
the solution has to be the sound discre-
tion of the arbitrator. I would not 
reject out of hand an offer to prove that 
the apparently clear and unambiguous 
was in fact intended to mean some-
thing totally different. But I would 
refuse proffered evidence that reflected 
one party's internal, uncommunicated 
understandings of the contract terms, 
and I would give short shrift to testi-
mony or exhibits that were vague and 
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not directly on target. The language 
finally chosen by the parties to embody 
their agreement is entitled to that 
much respect. 
Today's major issue concerning 
past practice is whether it can modify 
or override clear contract language to 
the contrary. My sense is that arbitra-
tors will find that a 
long-standing and 
well-accepted practice 
may prevail even over a 
clear, express provision 
in the agreement. 15 
However, there is also 
substantial authority 
that past practice can-
not trump an unam-
biguous contract 
term. 16 
Employers have 
responded to the en-
croachments of past 
practice by resorting to various types of 
"zipper" clauses designed to make the 
final written agreement the exclusive 
source of employee rights. Arbitrators 
are divided on the efficacy of this 
approach.17 
The past practice cases are highly 
fact-specific. Generalizations are haz-
ardous. But in my view two fundamen-
tal principles are apposite. First, any 
contract, including a collective bargain-
ing agreement, is subject to amend-
ment by the parties. Absent statutory 
or contractual restrictions, the parties 
can fashion their contract and amend it 
as they choose by deeds just as well as 
by words. Second, for a practice to 
become sufficiently well-established to 
be binding on the parties, it must meet 
the following usual criteria: clarity, 
consistency, longevity and mutual 
acceptability. Mutual acceptability is 
especially crucial if the practice is 
claimed to have superseded a clear, 
express contract provision to the con-
trary. If all these conditions are met, 
the practice should prevail over the 
contractual language. 
Once a great debate raged within 
the National Academy of Arbitrators 
over what an arbitrator should do when 
confronted with a conflict between the 
terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment and the requirements of external 
law. I still believe that in the rare case 
of an irreconcilable clash between con-
tract and law (or dominant public poli-
cy), if the parties have not expressly or 
impliedly authorized external law to be 
taken into account, the arbitrator 
should follow the contract and ignore 
the law. 18 
The civil rights statutes provide 
vital protections against discrimination 
in employment on the grounds of race, 
sex, religion, age, disability and the 
like. An arbitral award in a case where 
statutory rights are implicated is, of 
course, not entitled to the same final 
and binding effect that is customary in 
pure contract arbitrations. 19 But under 
footnote 21 in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver, an arbitration decision in a dis-
crimination case may be admitted in 
subsequent court proceedings and 
accorded "great weight" if certain con-
ditions are met. These conditions 
include contractual provisions that 
"conform substantially with [the 
applicable statute]," "procedural fair-
ness," "adequacy of the record," and 
the "special competence of particular 
arbitrators."20 
Advocates and arbitrators alike 
have a professional responsibility to 
ensure compliance with these Supreme 
Court standards in discrimination 
cases. Except for procedural fairness, 
which arbitrators presumably always 
bear in mind, the Gardner-Denver fac-
tors require deliberate attention. 
Even if an antidiscrimination pro-
vision in a collective bargaining con-
tract closely tracks a particular civil 
rights statute, the judicial gloss on the 
legislation should be considered. 
Advocates should educate the arbitrator 
on these nuances in their particular 
case. In turn the arbitrator should 
demonstrate an awareness of the 
applicable law and pertinent court 
interpretations. That will also serve to 
establish the arbitrator's "special com-
petence." This approach could require 
more than the two or three page opin-
ions often specified for expedited arbi-
trations. 
Thus, in all the steps of a case 
involving statutory claims, the arbitra-
tor should act "defensively" because of 
the possibility that the award may be 
challenged in court. (Whether that 
occurs will depend on the loser's 
assessment of its chances of securing a 
more favorable result in the courts.) 
Arbitrators should imagine that a fed-
eral judge is looking over their shoul-
der, scrutinizing every move and test-
ing it against the Gardner-Denver crite-
ria. That should sharpen everybody's 
skill at contract and statute reading! 
An analogous defensive approach 
also should be followed in the "public 
policy" cases. If a sexual harasser or a 
drug offender in a safe-
ty-sens 1 n v e job is 
involved, neither the 
advocates nor the arbi-
trator should turn a 
blind eye to the policy 
implications. Judicial 
review is a distinct pos-
sibility. The likelihood 
that the award will be 
upheld is increased if 
the arbitrator forth-
rightly confronts the 
policy issues and convincingly explains 
why the result reached is compatible 
with the public good. 
The roles of arbitrators and courts 
in interpreting and enforcing labor 
agreements are very different. The 
arbitrator is the parties' designated 
contract reader. Absent such abnormal 
circumstances as fraud, corruption or 
an exceeding of arbitral authority, the 
arbitrator's award should be accepted 
by a reviewing court as if it were the 
parties' own stipulated, definitive 
interpretation of the agreement. Of 
course, the award is subject to chal-
lenge for illegality or violation of pub-
lic policy. But that should be the limit 
of judicial review. If the parties them-
selves could lawfully have done what 
the arbitrator has ordered, the award 
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should be affirmed and enforced. 
In construing and applying the col-
lective bargaining agreement, arbitrators 
have employed a variety of traditional 
interpretive tools. I have rejected the 
broadest application of the plain mean-
ing rule, which precludes hearing evi-
dence that would contradict the con-
tract. I would admit at a hearing all cred-
ible evidence, within the constraints of 
procedural feasibility, which shows the 
actual intent of the parties. I would also 
accept proofs of well-established, mutu-
ally accepted practices that indicate a 
modification or amendment of the con-
tract. In so doing I am not trying to ele-
vate the arbitrator over the parties. My 
aim is to be faithful to the parties' mani-
fest intent in the deepest, truest sense. 
The days when unions, employers 
and arbitrators inhabited a self-made 
world of labor relations, for the most 
part untouched by public law and regu-
lation, are gone. Back then the parties 
generally had no way of challenging 
the arbitrator's final and binding pro-
nouncements, except to exclude that 
arbitrator from future service. Today, 
in cases involving a civil rights statute, 
a federal judge can bring an arbitrator 
up short with a one-line order. 
Arbitrators should not flinch from 
having to change some of their custom-
ary ways. Change, after all, is the law of 
growth and survival, and arbitrators 
ignore that truth at their peril. 
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